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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine you arrive home one evening to find that your house has been
plundered. Your television, computer, jewelry, and even your beloved pet gold-
fish have all been stolen. Outraged, you contact the local authorities in an
attempt to seek justice and protect your rights. A police investigation uncovers
not a single “mastermind,” but rather a partnership in crime between three nefa-
rious thieves, all equally complicit in planning and executing the theft. Unfortu-
nately, the investigating officers were all formerly employed by the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and possess an insatiable hunger
to extend the principles of patent law to their current endeavors. They casually
inform you that no one may be held responsible for the theft since no “single
entity” carried out all the elements of the plan nor directed and controlled the
actions of any of the other conspirators.
This might sound like an episode of CSI gone horribly wrong, but until
recently this was precisely what patent holders found when raising claims of
infringement for patented methods against joint or divided infringers. The “sin-
gle-entity” rule, in effect since the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(CAFC) decision in BMC v. Paymentech required that a single actor either
perform, direct, or control the performance of all the steps of a patented method
claim in order to be found liable for infringement.1
In September of 2012, the CAFC was given the opportunity to revisit the
single-entity rule in the case of Akamai v. Limelight.2 This Note will address
the holding of the court in that case, and the ramifications it may have on the
law of divided infringement. Part II of this Note will examine the historical
underpinnings of the law on divided infringement in patent, the various juris-
prudential standards, and the policy reasons for the various stances in this area.
Part III of this Note will explore how the Akamai case came before the CAFC
and will delve into the decision rendered by the Court. Part IV of this Note will
argue that current jurisprudence on divided infringement, while addressing
some issues, provides either incomplete guidance, or produces unsatisfactory
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1 BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
2 Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1305–06 (Fed. Cir.
2012).
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outcomes in the areas of comparative liability, remedies, and extra-territorial
enforcement of patent rights. Finally, Part V of this note will suggest legislative
or jurisprudential methods for tackling the problems of divided infringement.
II. UNDERPINNINGS OF DIVIDED INFRINGEMENT
Prior to 1952, the Federal Patent Act did not define the term infringe-
ment.3 During the enactment of the law, it was posited that the inclusion of a
definition was unnecessary because infringement was a natural byproduct of
the violation of the exclusive rights that were granted to patent holders under
the previous Act.4 Necessary or not, since 1952, infringement under the Patent
Act has been governed by 35 U.S.C. § 271.5
Currently, the Patent Act provides for several flavors of infringement that
are either expressly or impliedly defined. Section 271(a) defines “direct”
infringement, which provides that “whoever without authority makes, uses,
offers to sell, or sells any patented invention . . . infringes the patent.”6 Sections
271(b) and 271(c) define what is commonly known as “indirect” infringement.
Specifically, § 271(b) provides a definition for induced infringement, while
§ 271(c) provides a definition for contributory infringement.7
Congress has also sought to define other modes of infringement, which in
many cases expand the ability of patent holders to enforce their rights. These
additional forms of infringement include the submission of an application for
certain drugs under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act;8 supplying,
within or from the United States, substantial portions of components of a pat-
ented invention intended for combination outside of the United States;9 as well
as importing or offering to sell foreign manufactured goods within the United
States that were produced through a process patented within the United
States.10
These additions suggest that Congress appears to have the wherewithal
and ability to address problems that arise relating to the enforcement of patent
rights as both judicial interpretation of patent laws and technology evolve. This
conclusion was pointed out by Judge Linn in his Akamai dissent, and will be
discussed further in this Note.11
Despite these additions to § 271, and despite several other amendments to
the Patent Act since 1952,12 the text of the Act has remained silent on the issue
3 Robert J. Yarbrough, Inducement of Patent Infringement, YARBROUGHLAW.COM, http://yar
broughlaw.com/Publications/pubs_patent12_inducement_of_infringement.htm (last visited
Mar. 5, 2014).
4 H.R. REP. No. 82-1923, at 9 (1952).
5 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012).
6 Id. § 271(a).
7 Id. § 271 (b)–(c).
8 Id. § 271 (e)(2)(A).
9 Id. § 271 (f)(1).
10 Id. § 271 (g).
11 Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(Linn, J., dissenting) (“Congress knows how to create alternative forms of infringement.”).
12 Most recently the text was amended in 2011 by the America Invents Act. See generally
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (most notably
changing priority rules for granting patents from a “first to invent” system to a “first to file”
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of direct, divided infringement.13 While Congress has remained silent on the
issue, courts have struggled to deal with the problems of divided infringement
since as early as 1842.14 The solutions to these problems advanced by the
CAFC, including the “single entity” and “inducement only” rules, encompass
and combine elements from both direct and indirect infringement. As such, in
order to understand the framework of these doctrines, one must have a basic
understanding of the underlying principles of infringement.
A. Direct Infringement
The Patent Act does not expressly divide “direct” from “indirect” infringe-
ment. Regardless, courts have come to interpret § 271(a) of the Patent Act as
defining direct infringement.15 The statutory definition for direct infringement
appears relatively straightforward, but interpretations of a statute often hinge on
readings of the most basic elements of a statutory phrase. At least part of the
battle over direct but divided infringement has been waged over who the “who-
ever” in § 271(a) is referring to.
The CAFC in BMC interpreted this term to mean that entity which solely
performs, directs, or controls all of the elements necessary for infringement
under the section.16 In contrast, Judge Newman’s dissent in Akamai suggests
that it is consistent within the US Code to interpret “whoever” to encompass
both the singular and the plural.17 “By statutory canon the word ‘whoever’
embraces the singular and plural. The first statute in the United States Code, 1
U.S.C. § 1, states that . . . ‘words importing the singular include and apply to
several persons, parties, or things.’ ”18 Newman therefore resolved that the
plain meaning of the statute allowed multiple parties to be direct infringers, so
long as their combined efforts were sufficient to invade the exclusive rights of
the patent holder, ultimately concluding that she “need not belabor the quan-
dary of how there can be direct infringement but no direct infringers.”19
system). There have also been a number of other amendments to the Patent Act. See e.g.,
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107; Act
of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015; Act of Sept. 3, 1954, ch. 1259, 68 Stat.
1190.
13 The Patent Act defines two theories of joint liability—induced and contributory liabil-
ity—but these are considered “indirect” forms of liability. See discussion infra at II.B.
14 BRIAN FERRALL ET AL., THE COMPLICATED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MULTIPLE PARTY
PATENT INFRINGEMENT LIABILITY & COMMON LAW PRINCIPLES 6 (2011), available at http://
www.kvn.com/Templates/media/files/Articles/Multiple_Party_Patent_Infringement_Liabili
ty_Common_Law_Principles.pdf.
15 Mark A. Lemley et al., Divided Infringement Claims, 33 AIPLA Q. J. 255, 257 (2005).
16 BMC Res. Inc. v. Paymentech L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Courts faced
with a divided infringement theory have also generally refused to find liability where one
party did not control or direct each step of the patented process.”) (emphasis added).
17 Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(Newman, J., dissenting).
18 Id.
19 Id. at 1328.
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Direct infringement is generally considered to be a strict liability tort.20 A
direct infringer can be held liable for damages whether or not they intended to
infringe the patent.21 Liability even extends to infringers who are completely
ignorant of the existence of the patent.22 For a claim of direct infringement, the
element of knowledge primarily impacts the amount of damages that may be
assessed. A “willful” infringer, one that possessed knowledge of the patent
prior to infringing on it, may be assessed up to treble damages, relative to an
“innocent” infringer who was unaware of the patent.23
Thus, the monopoly established via patent is much stronger than other
types of intellectual property because where two inventors independently create
the same apparatus or process, only one will be eligible to enjoy patent rights.24
The doctrine of equivalents further broadens the monopoly of patent by provid-
ing patent holders with the ability to curtail the patent rights of other inventors
who create similar inventions utilizing different methods or components so
long as those inventions “perform[ ] substantially the same function in substan-
tially the same way to obtain the same result” as the patent holder’s inven-
tion.25 In contrast, under copyright law, two artists who simultaneously create
identical works can each hold rights over their creations.26
There are several reasons why patent law endows an exclusive rights
holder with the ability to bar independent creation and hold an innocent
infringer strictly liable. One reason is that, historically, patent rights have been
viewed through the lens of traditional property rights. In fact, as one writer put
it,
20 Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1527 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(“Infringement is, and should remain, a strict liability offense.”); see also Lemley et al.,
supra note 15, at 282.
21 Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 62 F.3d at 1527 (holding that infringement does not rest upon
the subjective awareness or intent of the infringer); see also FERRALL ET AL., supra note 14,
at 1.
22 Bate Refrigerating Co. v. Gillett, 31 F. 809, 816 (C.C.D.N.J. 1887) (explaining that igno-
rance of the existence of a patent is no defense to a suit for infringement).
23 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) (“Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claim-
ant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement . . . . [T]he court may increase the
damages up to three times the amount found or assessed.”); cf. Matthew D. Powers & Steven
C. Carlson, The Evolution and Impact of the Doctrine of Willful Patent Infringement, 51
SYRACUSE L. REV. 53, 57 (2001) (explaining that the increased damages clause in § 284 of
the Patent Act has been interpreted by courts to deter patent infringement by way of punish-
ing culpable infringers).
24 See Oskar Liivak, Rethinking the Concept of Exclusion in Patent Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 1643,
1643 (2010) (“Patent law’s broad exclusionary rule is one of its defining features. It is
unique within intellectual property because it prohibits acts of independent creation.”).
25 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950); see also
Martin J. Adelman & Gary L. Francione, The Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Law: Ques-
tions That Pennwalt Did Not Answer, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 707 (1989) (“Generally,
application of the doctrine of equivalents results in the broadening of a claim to cover some-
thing that was not passed on by the PTO during the initial examination process and the
consequent expansion of claim coverage.”).
26 Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936). Judge Learned
Hand famously wrote “[I]f by some magic a man who had never known it were to compose
anew Keats’s Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would be an ‘author,’ and, if he copyrighted it,
others might not copy that poem, though they might of course copy Keats’s.” Id.
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“[T]respass to land is surely the most analogous tort to patent infringement . . . it is
no defense to a trespass claim that the defendant did not realize that someone else
possessed the land in question. And like a patent claim, the remedy for trespass could
be actual damages or . . . a payment of rent for the period of occupation.27
Though patent rights might properly be considered property rights with
regard to certain aspects of enforcement,28 there are a number of reasons to
think that the analogy to trespass of land, while sometimes close in aspects of
enforcement, is difficult to maintain in terms of the actual contours of the rights
involved.29 Unlike trespass upon a typical piece of land, a classic case of patent
infringement may bring to light uncertainties about the very existence of the
patent rights (the validity of the patent), their duration (the term of the patent),
and their boundaries (the proper boundaries of the patent claims).30
Nonetheless, there are also policy reasons beyond the analogy to property
rights that underscore the choice of making direct infringement of patent a strict
liability offense. The very purpose of the patent law is “[t]o promote the
[p]rogress of [s]cience . . . by securing for limited [t]imes to . . . [i]nventors the
exclusive [r]ight to their respective . . . [d]iscoveries.”31 By making direct pat-
ent infringers strictly liable, the exclusivity of an inventor’s creation is height-
ened, theoretically creating a stronger incentive for inventors to discover and
publish new technologies, benefitting society as a whole.32
1. Direct Infringement of Method Patents
The question of whether direct infringement has occurred is comparatively
clear cut where the patent at issue is one for a product or apparatus. In such a
case, the party who completes the product, by installing the final part or assem-
bling the product, directly infringes the patent.33 Thus, the very presence of the
protected device or apparatus within the territorial limits of the patent, and
without the patent owner’s consent, is conclusive proof of the existence of a
27 FERRALL ET AL., supra note 14, at 11.
28 Both patent and property rights provide exclusionary privileges to rights holders. Just as a
property owner has the right to exclude others from his land, a patent holder has the right to
exclude others from his invention. 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS: A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT § 16.02(1)(a) (2012)
(explaining that patent only grants a negative right, the right to exclude).
29 See id.
30 FERRALL ET AL., supra note 14, at 11–12. Admittedly, there can be uncertainty about the
proper boundaries of a piece of property, but the relative degree of uncertainty as to the
boundaries of a typical patent claim can be exponentially higher because of its more abstract
nature.
31 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
32 See Mark A. Lemley, Should Patent Infringement Require Proof of Copying?, 105 MICH.
L. REV. 1525, 1529 (2007) (arguing that in cases where the barrier to invention is high cost,
an independent creation defense would discourage research in comparison to a pure strict
liability regime). But see Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent
Infringement, 105 MICH. L. REV. 475 (2006) (concluding that an independent invention
defense would create societal benefits, especially where an invention is likely to be discov-
ered by multiple inventors).
33 Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2012);
cf. 5 CHISUM, supra note 28, at § 16.02(3)(b) (noting that precedent has held that “a manu-
facturer escapes liability as a direct infringer if the accused device needs any substantial
assembly or adjustment in order to create an operable device meeting the patent claims”).
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direct infringer.34 In fact, a typical infringement claim involving a patented
product or apparatus could easily implicate three or more direct infringers: the
party who manufactured the product, the party who distributed or sold the prod-
uct, and the end user of the product.35
The question of infringement becomes murkier when the patent is a
method patent. A method patent, also referred to as a process patent, is a patent
that consists of a series of steps intended to bring about a certain result.36
Traditional process patents often detail steps to convert raw materials into fin-
ished products.37 Since it is the actual process rather than the end product that
is protected by the patent, the existence of the result is not dispositive in deter-
mining whether infringement has occurred.38
For example, an inventor might obtain a patent for the process of trans-
forming tree sap into syrup. The inventor might not have the exclusive right to
produce syrup,39 having instead only a monopoly over a particular series of
steps by which syrup may be manufactured. As syrup can be manufactured in
different ways, the very existence of a competing bottle of syrup is not conclu-
sive evidence of infringement.40 In order for the competitor to be found liable
for infringement, the patent holder must prove that while manufacturing the
syrup, the competitor performed each and every step of the process (or its
equivalent), in the order defined by the patent.41 Thus, under the definition of
§ 271(a), the only applicable mode of infringement is to “use” the process.
Selling or distributing instructions for the method would not be a basis for
direct infringement.42
34 Akamai Techs., Inc., 692 F.3d at 1316 (“For product claims, whenever the product is
made, used, or sold, there is always a direct infringer.”).
35 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) (“[W]hoever . . . makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any pat-
ented invention . . . infringes the patent.”).
36 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972) (“A process is a mode of treatment of
certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the
subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing.”).
37 See e.g., Process for Making Diamonds, U.S. Patent No. 3,714,332 (filed Apr. 21, 1971);
Process for Producing Paper, U.S. Patent No. 5,695,609 (filed Jan. 19, 1996); Process for
Pasteurizing Raw Poultry, U.S. Patent No. 4,045,579 (filed Aug. 14, 1975).
38 See Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 574 (1876) (holding that there was no infringement
by defendant who manufactured a nearly identical oil, because plaintiff held only a patent on
the process). Claiming a patent on a process does not provide protection for the result of the
process because the claims of the patent must be identified with enough specificity to pro-
vide a clear warning as to what constitutes infringement. See 3 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM
ON PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT
§ 8.03 (2010).
39 It is possible that the inventor would have a patent for both the process and the end
product, but it is also equally possible that the inventor has no such patent, and the product
can be created in a number of different ways.
40 See Merrill, 94 U.S. at 574.
41 Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
42 See Ricoh Co. v. Quanta Computer Inc., 550 F.3d 1325, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[W]e
hold that a party that sells or offers to sell software containing instructions to perform a
patented method does not infringe the patent under § 271(a).”). Under the current doctrine of
induced infringement, it seems that there may be indirect liability for these actions. See
discussion infra II.B.1.
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The conditions under which a process is deemed to be infringed are more
relevant than ever because of an explosion in patenting processes which do not
bring about a change to some physical subject matter, but are instead concerned
with procedures that govern commercial transactions, especially via the
internet.43 These patents are most commonly referred to as business-method
patents.44 In many cases these patents speak to the issues of joint infringement
because, either out of necessity or efficiency, they require that multiple parties
act in concert to complete the patented method, especially in internet applica-
tions where often times there is a division of labor between client and server.45
Unlike with the manufacture of tangible items, where the various parties are
likely to have contractual or agency relationships with one another, it is not
uncommon that the parties performing a business-method patent have little or
no formal relationship.46
2. Joint Infringement and the Single-entity rule
When method patents are performed by the combined actions of multiple
parties, courts have recognized that sometimes it is appropriate to find one
party liable for direct infringement by attributing to that party the actions of
others, so that the combination of their actions satisfies the entirety of the pat-
ent claim. The extent of the relationship necessary between parties in order for
courts to attribute their actions to one another is a critical and evolving aspect
of joint infringement doctrine.47 Currently, courts attribute to the accused
infringer the conduct of additional parties only through principles of vicarious
liability.48 A party who does not perform each and every step of a process
patent, either directly or vicariously through another, incurs no direct liability.
The cases of BMC Resources v. Paymentech and Muniauction v. Thomson
Corporation currently define the contours of the relationship necessary to attri-
43 Business method patents are commonly granted under patent classes 705, 707, and 709.
The number of Patents granted under these classes in 2012 doubled the amount granted in
2008. Patent Counts By Class By Year January 1977 – December 2012, USPTO.GOV, http://
www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/cbcby.htm (last modified Apr. 2, 2013). The
value and propriety of granting business method patents has been a source of intense debate.
See Samidh Chakrabarti, Business Method Patents: A Faustian Bargain With Fosbury Flops
2 (June 2005) (unpublished dissertation, University of Cambridge), available at http://
samidhchakrabarti.files.wordpress.com/2010/02/business_method_patents_dissertation.pdf.
In response to the confusion over patentability, the Supreme Court has recently granted certi-
orari in a case (Alice Corp. v. CLS) that could impact the ability to patent or enforce business
method claims that are implemented through software programs. See Daniel Fisher, Supreme
Court Prepares to Wade Into ‘La Brea Tar Pits’ Of Software Patents, FORBES (Dec. 13,
2013, 12:56 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2013/12/13/supreme-court-pre
pares-to-wade-into-la-brea-tar-pits-of-software-patents/.
44 See John. J. Love & Wynn W. Coggins, Successfully Preparing and Prosecuting a Busi-
ness Method Patent Application, Presentation Before the American Intellectual Property
Law Association (Spring 2001), available at http://www.uspto.gov/patents/resources/meth
ods/index.jsp.
45 See Timothy R. Holbrook, The Potential Extraterritorial Consequences of Akamai, 26
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 499, 499 (2012).
46 See, e.g., Muniauction, Inc., 532 F.3d at 1321 (claim against web based auction system
where bidders had no contractual relationship with auctioneer).
47 See FERRALL ET AL., supra note 14.
48 BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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bute activities between parties in joint infringement actions.49 In BMC, the
plaintiff acquired a patent for a method by which consumers could use their
debit cards to make payments, without prior registration or the need for a per-
sonal identification number (PIN), via a telephone and keypad.50 This process
worked through the interaction of several participants, including the customer,
the debit network, and the financial institution from which the customer’s
money was drawn.51
BMC sued Paymentech for direct infringement of their patent when Pay-
mentech began advertising PIN-less bill payment services that were practically
identical to their own.52 Paymentech moved for summary judgment on the
basis that some of the steps in the process were performed by other parties such
as the customer or his financial institution.53 BMC argued that it was unneces-
sary for Paymentech to have performed all the steps in order to be found liable
for direct infringement because there was a relationship of “participation and
combined action” between Paymentech and the various parties.54 BMC’s the-
ory of joint liability for direct infringement was based on the tacit approval of a
jury instruction in another CAFC case, On Demand Machine Corporation v.
Ingram Industries.55 In that case, the jury instruction provided that
[i]t is not necessary for the acts that constitute infringement to be performed by one
person or entity. When infringement results from the participation and combined
action(s) of more than one person or entity, they are all joint infringers and jointly
liable for patent infringement. Infringement of a patented process or method cannot
be avoided by having another perform one step of the process or method.56
The court found BMC’s reliance on On Demand misplaced because the
main issue in the On Demand case was claim construction, rather than the
doctrine of joint infringement.57 The court concluded that On Demand did not
set precedent in this area of law, noting that it was “unlikely the [On Demand]
Court intended to make a major change in . . . jurisprudence . . . that was not
even directly necessary to its decision in the case.”58
Rather than adopting the standard of participation and combined action,
the court found that the conduct of the various parties could only be attributed
to Paymentech through principles of vicarious liability, which required a single
“mastermind” to have directed or controlled their actions. Since the relationship
between Paymentech and the other parties to the transaction was inadequate to
demonstrate this level of direction or control, Paymentech could not be liable
for direct infringement.59 This holding was termed the “single-entity rule.”60
49 Id. at 1378; Muniauction, Inc., 532 F.3d at 1328.
50 BMC Res., Inc., 498 F.3d at 1375.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 1375–76.
53 Id. at 1375–78.
54 Id. at 1379–80.
55 Id.
56 On Demand Mach. Corp. v. Ingram Indus., Inc., 442 F.3d 1331, 1344–45 (Fed. Cir.
2006).
57 BMC Res., Inc., 498 F.3d at 1380.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 1379–81.
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The CAFC further defined the relationship necessary for a party to exer-
cise direction or control in Muniacution. The plaintiff held a patent for a pro-
cess by which investors would bid on bulk municipal bonds through an internet
auction website.61 They filed suit against Thomson, a competing auction com-
pany that had modified its own process by which bidders and issuers initially
connected to each through the use of Thomson’s proprietary software, to one in
which parties could participate through the use of an ordinary internet connec-
tion and website.62 The trial court ruled in favor of Muniauction, found Thom-
son’s infringement willful, and awarded Muniauction approximately $77
million in lost profits.63
On appeal, the CAFC overturned the decision of the trial court.64 It held
that several of Muniauction’s independent claims were invalid due to obvi-
ousness, and the remaining dependent claims failed because they did not satisfy
the vicarious liability test for direction or control.65 Specifically, the court
found that the access control that Thomson exercised over bidders who wished
to use Thomson’s service was insufficient to satisfy the elements of the BMC
standard.66 In practice, the combination of the BMC and Muniauction holdings
represents a difficult standard to meet when seeking to combine the actions of
multiple actors for the purpose of bringing a direct infringement claim because
the parties must have an agency or near-agency relationship.
B. Indirect Infringement
The doctrine of indirect infringement provides courts with the means to
assess liability for infringement on the basis of actions that are culpable, but
otherwise insufficient to establish liability under the direct infringement doc-
trine of § 271(a).67 The 1952 Act codified indirect infringement at § 271(b) and
§ 271(c). These sections did not represent a new theory of patent liability;
instead, they merely codified, and parsed out, existing theories of “collabora-
tive” liability, in which the courts held responsible those who “aided and abet-
ted” patent infringement.68 Specifically, they separated the theory of
contributive liability into two components: induced infringement and contribu-
tory infringement. Unlike direct infringement, which is a strict liability infrac-
60 Damon Gupta, Virtually Uninfringeable: Valid Patents Lacking Protection Under the
Single Entity Rule, 94 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 61, 63 (2012).
61 Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
62 Id. at 1323.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 1321.
65 Id. at 1330.
66 Id.
67 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012). Technically, under this definition, all modes of infringement
other than direct infringement under § 271(a) could be considered “indirect” infringement,
but for our purposes indirect infringement is represented by the less specialized modes of
infringement set out in §§ 271(b)–(c).
68 See Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 80 F. 712, 721 (6th Cir. 1897).
An infringement of a patent is a tort analogous to trespass or trespass on the case. From the
earliest times, all who take part in a trespass, either by actual participation therein or by aiding
and abetting it, have been held to be jointly and severally liable for the injury inflicted.
Id.
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tion, requiring no knowledge by the infringer about the existence of the patent,
indirect liability requires the infringer to possess some form of requisite knowl-
edge and intent.69
1. Induced & Contributory Infringement
Section 271(b) provides that “[w]hoever actively induces infringement of
a patent shall be liable as an infringer.”70 Inducement occurs when one party
“advises, encourages, or otherwise induces others to engage in infringing con-
duct.”71 Induced infringement is in some ways more difficult to prove than
direct infringement, but is arguably the broadest theory of liability because the
conduct elements such as “encouraging” or “advising” can be more easily
proven than showing the party performed each and every part of the patent.72
Contributory infringement occurs when a party supplies components of a
patented product, apparatus, or process knowing that such components will be
used in infringement of the patent.73 Contributory infringement is more likely
in the context of a patent for a product, system, or apparatus.74 However, it
could also occur where there is a patent for some types of processes. For exam-
ple, revisiting our hypothetical syrup-manufacturing method, a party who pro-
vides the direct infringer with a machine specially adapted to carry out the
patented process may be held liable as a contributory infringer.75
2. Level of Intent Necessary for Indirect Liability
One way in which indirect liability under § 271(c) differs from direct
infringement under § 271(a) is that the former expressly introduces a knowl-
edge and intent element that is not present in the latter.76 The plain language of
§ 271(b), however, contains no express knowledge requirement for intent on
the part of an infringer, merely stating that one who “actively” induces
infringement may be held liable as an inducer.77 In practice, courts have inter-
69 Ben Morgan, Joint Infringement and the Impact of BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech,
L.P., 12 SMU SCI. TECH. L. REV. 173, 174 (2009).
70 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2012).
71 Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
72 Id. at 1308.
73 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2012).
Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into the United States a
component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a material or
apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of the invention,
knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such
patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing
use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.
Id.
74 Many method patents, especially those that are implemented through computer software,
do not consist of a set of components that could form the basis of a contributory infringe-
ment claim.
75 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). The statute provides a safe harbor to suppliers of “staple article[s]”
that have “substantial noninfringing use[s].” Id. Thus, a supplier of standard hex bolts may
provide these products to a direct infringer, even if the supplier knows with certainty that the
bolts will be used in an infringing apparatus.
76 Compare 35 U.S.C § 271(a) (2012), with 35 U.S.C. § 271(c).
77 35 U.S.C. § 271(b).
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preted § 271(b) to require the same level of knowledge and intent as well,
determining that the phrase “actively induces” infers this element.78 The pres-
ence of a knowledge requirement means that indirect liability is a theory requir-
ing culpability, rather than a theory of strict liability.79
Since the enactment of the 1952 Patent Act there has been confusion over
the amount of intent required to satisfy the “active” element of the statute.80
The courts have increasingly made the element of intent more difficult for pat-
ent holders to demonstrate. Currently, the intent requirement for active induce-
ment is governed by precedent set in Global-Tech Appliances v. SEB, decided
by the US Supreme Court in 2011.81
The Court in Global-Tech found that the appropriate standard of intent for
a claim of induced infringement was identical to the intent requirement neces-
sary to prove claims of contributory infringement; namely, in order to actively
induce infringement, the defendant “must know that the induced acts constitute
patent infringement.”82
The Court held that this knowledge could be shown directly or imputed
through the criminal concept of “willful blindness.”83 The Court explained that
“deliberate indifference to a known risk that a patent exists is not the appropri-
ate standard” to impute knowledge through the doctrine of willful blindness,
and concluded that, instead, the plaintiff must prove a defendant was aware of
the “high probability that a fact exists” and took “deliberate actions to avoid
learning of th[e] fact[s].”84 The holding did away with the “known or should
have known” standard used in previous cases decided by the Federal Circuit
and made it more difficult for patent holders to prove that an accused infringer
had sufficient intent.
3. Induced Infringement Under the Single-Entity Rule
While the Global Tech ruling tasked plaintiffs with proving a heightened
standard of knowledge in induced infringement actions, the BMC ruling created
even greater hurdles to proving induced infringement for certain types of
method claims. The BMC court found that the single-entity rule applied not
only to claims of direct infringement, but also to those of induced infringement
under § 271(b).85 The court applied the rule to induced infringement because it
recognized § 271(a) as the statutory definition in the Patent Act for the term
78 See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2065 (2011).
79 See Morgan, supra note 69, at 174.
80 Jason A. Rantanen, An Objective View of Fault in Patent Infringement, 60 AM. U. L.
REV. 1575, 1594–602 (2011) (discussing the general historical progression of the interpreta-
tion intent prong of the 1952 Patent Act); see also Andrew Ward, Inducing Infringement:
Specific Intent and Damages Calculation, 94 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 1, 5 (2012)
(“After the codification of contributory infringement, courts struggled with the meaning of
‘active inducement.’ ”).
81 Global-Tech Appliances, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2068.
82 Id. at 2063, 2067–68.
83 Id. at 2068–69, 2071.
84 Id. at 2068, 2070.
85 BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(“[I]nducement of infringement requires a predicate finding of direct infringement.”).
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“infringement.”86 This definition of infringement was read in conjunction with
the plain language of § 271(b), which provided that “[w]hoever actively
induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.”87 Taken
together, induced infringement could only occur where a single party had been
induced to perform all the steps required for infringement.88 To put it another
way, there could be no induced infringer without a single, underlying direct
infringer.89
Because the direction or control standard was only satisfied by agency-
type relationships, this interpretation made a number of valid patents practically
impossible to enforce under any doctrine of infringement.90 Most notably, pat-
ents which called for several independent parties to act in conjunction with one
another to complete a patented process were essentially immune from
enforcement.91
Finally, strict application of the rule even meant that where the inducing
party also performed one or more of the steps themselves and then induced the
remaining steps, no infringement could be found.92 In short, the application of
the single-entity rule in these situations highlighted a glaring hole in patent
enforcement.93
The BMC court acknowledged that this standard would allow some parties
to escape liability by entering into arms-length agreements,94 but determined
that this possibility was an insufficient reason to extend the strict liability doc-
trine of direct infringers to “reach independent conduct of multiple actors.”95
The court placed the onus on claim drafters to capture this type of infringement
by drafting claims in such a way that they can be infringed by a single party, as
86 Id. (holding that infringement is derived from the “statute itself” at § 271(a)).
87 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2012) (emphasis added).
88 BMC Res., Inc., 498 F.3d at 1380.
89 Id.
90 See Gupta, supra note 60, at 61–62.
91 Id. at 61.
92 Id. at 62–63.
93 A number of infringement claims have been dismissed at the trial court level for failure to
meet the standards of the single-entity rule. See, e.g., Global Patent Holdings, LLC v.
Panthers BRHC LLC, 586 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1335–36 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (dismissed for failure
to show that remote users who performed elements of claim were under the direction and
control of defendant); Friday Group v. Ticketmaster, No. 4:08CV01203, 2008 WL 5233078,
at *4 (E.D. Mo. 2008) (dismissed for failure to allege that any one defendant performed all
the elements of the claim); PA Advisors, LLC v. Google, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 2d 739, 748–49
(E.D. Tex. 2010) (finding non-infringement where portions of a method for searching the
internet were initiated by the user, and the rest by the search provider’s system).
94 BMC Res., Inc., 498 F.3d at 1381.
95 Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\14-2\NVJ214.txt unknown Seq: 13  9-APR-14 9:40
632 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:620
suggested by commentator Mark Lemley.96 These were the issues before an en
banc Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in Akamai v. Limelight (Akamai II).97
III. THE AKAMAI DECISION
A. Background of the Case
In 2010 and 2011, panels of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals consid-
ered two cases involving the issue of divided infringement, Akamai Technolo-
gies v. Limelight Networks and McKesson Information Solutions v. Epic
Systems Corporation.98 In Akamai, the patent holder had developed a method
for efficient delivery of internet content.99 Their method consisted of a process
through which a bank of servers stored portions of content to be displayed on a
client’s web page.100 The client’s web page was modified, or “tagged,” by
Akamai to allow access to these servers, resulting in more efficient delivery of
the content.101
Limelight was accused of both direct and induced infringement of the pro-
cess when it operated a similar bank of servers that also stored portions of web
content for efficient delivery and delivered this content to properly configured
client websites.102 However, in contrast to the procedures used by Akamai,
Limelight did not directly perform the step of tagging its clients’ websites.
Instead, Limelight provided instructions to its clients on how modify their sites,
and the website owners then performed the necessary modifications them-
selves.103 Due to this division of labor, Limelight sought protection under the
single-entity rule found in BMC and made a motion for judgment as a matter of
law, claiming no infringement had occurred. The district court granted the
motion.104 Akamai then appealed to the CAFC. The CAFC affirmed the deci-
sion of the district court on the premise that, under the standard of “direction
and control” set forth in Muniauction, Limelight did not infringe because it had
not performed all the steps of the claim, and there was no agency or contractual
relationship between Limelight and its customers.105
96 Id. See also Lemley et al., supra note 15, at 272 (“Most inventions that involve coopera-
tion of multiple entities can be covered using claims drafted in unitary form simply by focus-
ing on one entity and whether it supplies or receives any given element.”). Claims drafted in
this manner are coined “unitary” claims. For example, a claim which recites a process in
which 1) party A inputs data into a database and sends it to party B, who then 2) compiles
the data, and 3) sends a summary of the data back to party A, could be drafted in a unitary
manner by changing step 1 to read “Party B receives inputted data from party A.” This
would allow the claim to be infringed by the actions of party B alone.
97 Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1305–06 (Fed. Cir.
2012).
98 Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 629 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2010),
vacated, en banc reh’g granted; McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp., No. 2010–1291,
2011 WL 1365548 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 12, 2011), vacated, en banc reh’g granted.
99 Akamai Techs., Inc., 692 F.3d at 1306.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id. 
103 Id.
104 Id. at 1351.
105 Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 629 F.3d 1311, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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In McKesson, the patent holder attempted to enforce a claim on its process
which provided patients, health care providers, doctors, and other medical pro-
fessionals with a means to share medical information electronically via a
software system over the internet. McKesson asserted that the defendant, Epic,
induced infringement under § 271(b) when it provided health care providers
with software entitled “MyChart” which accomplished the same tasks detailed
in the McKesson patent.106
Epic asserted that the communications in the software platform were initi-
ated by the patient and other users on the system, with no single entity perform-
ing all the steps in the patented method.107 As a result, Epic claimed that it
could not be liable for induced infringement and moved for summary judgment.
McKesson argued that Epic satisfied the “direction and control” test because it
controlled access to the MyChart software by granting user identifications and
passwords.108 The trial court found that the access control which Epic provided
was inadequate to meet the single-entity standard and granted the motion for
summary judgment.109 As in the Akamai case, McKesson’s appeal to the
CAFC was unsuccessful based upon precedent in both Muniauction and
BMC.110 In his concurrence, Judge Bryson, while agreeing that Muniauction
and BMC were controlling, expressed concerns about the wisdom of the prece-
dent in these cases and noted that the standard “may warrant review by the en
banc court in an appropriate case.”111
An appropriate case was soon found when the plaintiffs in Akamai, after
the publication of Judge Bryson’s concurrence, requested just such a hearing
before the CAFC.112 The request was granted, and shortly thereafter McKesson
filed its own request for an en banc hearing.113 The two cases were then consol-
idated for rehearing before the CAFC. The question the parties were instructed
to brief the court on was “[i]f separate entities each perform separate steps of a
method claim, under what circumstances would that claim be directly infringed
and to what extent would each of the parties be liable?”114
B. The New Precedent Under Akamai II
In a sharply divided decision, an en banc CAFC reversed the district court
in both the Akamai and McKesson cases in Akamai II, holding that the single-
entity rule did not bar claims of indirect infringement.115 However, rather than
directly tackling the problem of the single-entity rule and direct infringement as
106 Akamai Techs., Inc., 692 F.3d at 1306–07.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 1336 (Newman, J., dissenting).
109 Id. at 1324, 1336 (explaining summary judgment was based on the precedent in
Muniauction in which held that access control was insufficient for liability).
110 Id. at 1306–07 (per curiam opinion).
111 McKesson Techs., Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp., No. 2010–1291, 2011 WL 1365548 (Fed. Cir.
Apr. 12, 2011).
112 Order Granting En Banc Rehearing, Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc.,
06-CV-11109, 06-CV-11585 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 20, 2011).
113 Order Granting En Banc Rehearing, McKesson Techs., Inc. v. Epic Sys., Corp., 06-CV-
2965 (Fed. Cir. May 26, 2011).
114 Order Granting En Banc Rehearing, supra note 112, at 2.
115 Akamai Techs., Inc., 692 F.3d at 1306, 1318–19.
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it applied to multiple parties, the court side-stepped the issue.116 The court
explicitly stated that “[i]t is not necessary for us to resolve [the issue of divided,
direct infringement] today because we find that these cases and cases like them
can be resolved through an application of the doctrine of induced
infringement.”117
The decision created a bifurcated approach to divided infringement, where
§ 271(a) is appropriate only for infringement that can be attributed to a single
party under the BMC precedent, while § 271(b) is used for infringement attrib-
utable to more than one party.118 In promoting this approach, the court essen-
tially left the single-entity doctrine for direct infringement untouched.119
Instead, the Court abandoned the notion that § 271(a) defined the standard
of patent infringement for the rest of the statute, and held that “all the steps of a
claimed method must be performed in order to find induced infringement, but
that it is not necessary to prove that all the steps were committed by a single
entity.”120 The result of this interpretation is that patent professionals, patent
holders, and would-be “infringers” now have a new set of questions about cer-
tain aspects of divided infringement to which there appears to be little or no
guidance from either the court or the statute.
IV. AFTERMATH OF AKAMAI II: THE GOOD, THE BAD,
AND THE UNANSWERED
A. The Good: Increased Protection for Method Patents
The Akamai II holding contains good news for holders of method patents
who under the single-entity rule had no prospect of being able to enforce their
rights because it was either incapable or impractical to construct the terms of
their patent claims in a “unitary” manner. Parties are no longer assured freedom
from liability for infringement because they assigned the steps of a method
claim to customers or entered into arms-length agreements (cooperative
infringement arrangements). Parties currently in litigation have already exper-
ienced varying degrees of success in applying the precedent of Akamai II to
their ongoing suits.121
In addition, the ruling strikes a balance between expanding the enforce-
ment of divided infringement claims while maintaining the innocence of par-
ticipants whose actions are less than culpable. Plaintiffs who cannot prove an
agency-type relationship necessary to satisfy the single-entity rule for direct
infringement must instead provide evidence for knowledge intent under the
116 Id. at 1306.
117 Id. 
118 Holbrook, supra note 45, at 508. (“[T]he court rejects the single entity rule for induced
infringement but retains the requirement for direct infringement.”).
119 Id.
120 Akamai Techs., Inc., 692 F.3d at 1306.
121 See CIVIX–DDI, LLC v. Hotels.com, LP, 904 F. Supp. 2d 864, 869–70 (N.D. Ill. 2012)
(granting reconsideration to motion based on precedent in Akamai II); but see Centillion
Data Sys., LLC v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., No. 1:04-cv-0073, 2012 WL 4897619 (S.D.
Ind. Oct. 15, 2012) (declining to extend Akamai precedent to established findings of fact).
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induced infringement standard. This exacting standard should protect innocent
participants from being ensnared.
B. The Bad: Fear and Loathing in Patent Litigation
The dissenting opinions authored by Newman and Linn in Akamai II point
out several shortcomings in the majority ruling, and commentators have high-
lighted several more. The decision creates uncertainty and possible inequity
with regard to who may or may not be held liable for infringement, what reme-
dies are available to the patent holder, and the extent of liability to which the
inducer may be exposed.122 Finally, by distinguishing § 271(a) and § 271(b) as
separate causes of action, the court has arguably created uncertainty in main-
taining the territorial nature of patents in instances of inducement.
1. Unbalanced Liability for Infringement
Without the need for a direct infringer as a prerequisite for induced
infringement, an induced infringer may presumably be the only liable party,
even if that infringer’s actions represented only a small portion of the total
infringement.123 For example, consider a method patent which consists of five
individual steps. Inducer A performs the first step in the process, and “encour-
ages” infringer B to perform the rest of the process. B does so, fully performing
steps two through five. Assuming that both A and B know a patent exists for
the process, justice would seem to demand that B should be at least as liable, if
not more liable, than A. However, under Akamai II, B has no liability under
any theory of either direct or indirect infringement. Thus, while at once sparing
innocent infringers, the inducement only rule may at the same time also protect
those infringers who are arguably most culpable.
As Judge Newman pointed out in her dissent, this inability to impute lia-
bility to all those responsible for the infringement can lead to additional
enforcement problems.124 For example, let us suppose that in the hypothetical
outlined above, the first step in the infringement (performed by A), once per-
formed, need not be performed again for multiple iterations of the process. This
scenario might also lead to A being liable for multiplicative damages125 each
time B performs the additional steps in the patent.126 These multiplicative dam-
ages further accentuate the injustice as to the liability between A and B, and are
122 See Akamai Techs., Inc., 692 F.3d at 1321 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“[T]he court gives
no attention to the accompanying new issues such as the measure of damages, or the availa-
bility of remedy against direct infringement.”).
123 See id. at 1330 (“Since the direct infringers cannot be liable for infringement, they do
not appear to be subject to the court’s jurisdiction.”).
124 See id.
125 See id. (questioning whether inducers will be subject to multiplicative damages); 7 DON-
ALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTABILITY, VALID-
ITY AND INFRINGEMENT § 20.03(7)(b)(iv) (2013) (“[T]he appropriate measure of monetary
relief against an indirect infringer (i.e. one who contributes to or induces infringement) will
be the same as that against the direct infringer.”); Ward, supra note 80, at 21–22 (“An
inducer of infringement is jointly liable with the direct infringer for the infringement . . . .
Damages in any [patent] case are based on . . . (1) lost profits, (2) an established royalty, or
(3) a reasonable royalty.”).
126 See Ward, supra note 80, at 21–22.
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based on an extended theory of accomplice liability that threatens to place a
significant and, in many cases, unwarranted amount of comparative liability on
an indirect infringer.127
2. Lack of Enforcement Options for Patent Holders
What may be even more disturbing than the possible multiplicative liabil-
ity for the inducer is the potential inability to prevent the remaining infringers
from engaging in the infringing behavior. By creating a system of inducement-
only liability, the patent holder may have little or no recourse for halting the
infringement of her patent.
Consider the example above as it applies to enforcement options for the
holder of the patent (P). Imagine P manages to sway a court to enjoin A from
inducing further infringement of his patent. B is completely unaffected by this
injunction, assuming as above that A’s step need not be repeated. B has in
effect earned a license to infringe upon P’s patent. Further, it is unclear what
the court can actually enjoin A from doing. Is A only enjoined from inducing
infringement, or is A enjoined from performing the portion of the method
which contributed to the ultimate infringement?128
The facts in Akamai II provide a concrete illustration of this problem.
Limelight was found potentially liable for inducement when it provided instruc-
tions to its clients on how to modify their web pages to access their content
from Limelight’s servers.129 Since a method patent cannot be infringed without
each and every step being performed, the mere operation of Limelight’s servers
in storing content falls short of infringement. Therefore, it seems unlikely that a
court could enjoin Limelight from taking down its content servers. It is more
probable that the court would enjoin Limelight from providing instructions to
clients as to how to modify their sites to interface with Limelight’s content
servers. This solution would leave Limelight’s current clients with the ability to
continue to take advantage of Akamai’s patent.
3. The Issue of Extraterritorial Enforcement
Opponents of the Akamai II decision also argue that another possible
problem arising out of the ruling is an extension of the scope of US patent law.
Going as far back as 1856, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the
exclusive rights granted to patent holders are highly territorial in nature.130 The
reasons for the presumption of territoriality are many and varied, including
“[p]otential conflicts with another nation’s laws, international comity, choice-
of-law issues, congressional intent, and separation of powers.”131
127 See id. at 21.
128 It seems unlikely that the court would have the power to enjoin a party from taking an
action for which there is no legal wrong. One of the basic elements for any injunction is that
the requesting party has either already succeeded (permanent injunction) or is likely to suc-
ceed on the merits of the case (preliminary injunction).
129 See discussion supra II.B.1.
130 Timothy R. Holbrook, Extraterritoriality in U.S. Patent Law, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV.
2119, 2130–31 (2008).
131 Id. at 2129.
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The basis for the territorial nature of patent is also found in the Patent Act
itself. Infringement under § 271(a) provides that an infringer must engage in
infringing conduct “within the United States” or import a patented invention
“into the United States.”132 This jurisdictional hook is also present under con-
tributory infringement in § 271(c).133 However, as Timothy Holbrook pointed
out, it is noticeably absent from the definition of induced infringement under §
271(b).134 Previously, this was no issue at all for the court because § 271(a)
was deemed to provide the definition of infringement for § 271(b). The court’s
new “inducement only” reading of the statute under Akamai II, as previously
discussed, severs this link between the sections, holding that they are separate
causes of action in and of themselves, and wholly independent of one another.
The (likely unintended) result of this independence is that unlike either collabo-
rative or direct infringement, induced infringement no longer seems to engen-
der the territorial limitations so prized by the Supreme Court in its patent law
jurisprudence.
V. A MODEL FOR THE RESOLUTION OF JOINT INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS
A. The Need for a Legislative Remedy
Patent rights are granted by statute under the authority granted to Congress
in the Constitution, and do not generally exist at common law. This fact man-
dates, where possible, that solutions to the issue of divided infringement be set
forth in a legislative, rather than judicial, manner.135 The oft-times confusing
and conflicting jurisprudence on divided infringement indicates that practically
the only certainty in this area of law is confusion. Ultimately, the scope of the
exclusive rights granted under the Patent Act are questions of policy. As Judge
Linn pointed out in his dissent, “[t]he fact that Congress was aware of BMC
and Muniauction when it reformed the 1952 Patent Act indicates that Congress
did not intend to abrogate the single entity rule for direct infringement, or
broaden indirect infringement liability . . . .”136 Though the failure to legislate
cannot be categorically looked at as an approval of current policy due to the
complex nature of the legislative process,137 the point is still well-taken; patent
law, as a creature of statute, should be modified by statute.
1. Congress Should Lend Clarity to the Patent Act
The first and most obvious step Congress should take to address the prob-
lem of divided infringement for method patents is to reduce the confusion in
§ 271(a). Under the new inducement-only rule, the term “infringement” is
thought to exist outside of the definition of this section, and simply refers to the
132 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012).
133 35 U.S.C. § 271(c).
134 35 U.S.C. § 271(b).
135 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305 (2012).
136 Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(Linn, J., dissenting).
137 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 67
(1988) (discussing that at times legislative inaction is viewed as acquiescence to judicial
interpretation, while at other times this notion is rejected).
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violation of the patentee’s rights that occurs when each and every step of the
process is performed.138 The inducement-only rule interprets § 271(a) as pro-
viding a definition of who may be held liable as a direct infringer, rather than
whether infringement has occurred.139 In contrast, under the “single-entity”
rule, the term infringement was thought to be explicitly defined in the text of
§ 271(a). Congress should remove this ambiguity by re-defining the term to
include a joint-infringement standard.
For example, a definition of infringement could be added to § 100 of the
Patent Act essentially declaring that “except as otherwise defined, infringement
is the act of making, using, offering to sell, or selling, a patented invention or
fully performing a patented method process, within the United States, without
regard to whether such act or acts are performed singly or in combination with
multiple actors.” Such a definition would clarify whether infringement can
occur outside of the presence of a direct infringer. In addition, it would solve
the extraterritoriality issue that occurs under the current text, where infringe-
ment under § 271(b) is defined outside of § 271(a).
2. Loosening the Standard for Direct, Joint Infringement
The courts in BMC and Muniauction expressly rejected the jury instruc-
tion in On Demand that allowed the court to find joint infringers liable through
a “participation and combined action(s)” standard.140 However, this may be a
more viable alternative than instituting the inducement-only rule because this
rule ignores the actions of culpable parties who may have the knowledge and
intent to share liability under an inducement standard, but possess the good
fortune to have only actually performed protected elements of the process,
rather than merely encouraged others to do so.
The inducement-only rule moves the ball slightly forward in attaining the
goal of better patent enforcement by at least making someone liable in certain
multi-party infringement situations. However, the goals of patent law would be
better served if policies were devised to hold the right party (or parties) respon-
sible, rather than just any party.
The rule risks implicating parties who have little, if any, culpability and
whose actions may be undeserving of exposure to the world of intellectual
property litigation. At present, policy makers appear to find these risks accept-
able. The implication of other current patent doctrines, which include strict lia-
bility for direct infringement and lack of an “independent creation” defense
suggest that the goal of patent enforcement takes precedence over the risk of
ensnaring relatively innocent parties.
Nevertheless, unjust exposure to litigation could be greatly mitigated if
Congress allowed damages to be apportioned based on the relative culpability
of the various parties.141 Further, while keeping the strict liability doctrine alive
for single-party infringement claims, Congress could limit the remedy against
138 Akamai Techs., Inc., 692 F.3d at 1314.
139 Id.
140 BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1379–80 (Fed. Cir. 2007);
Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1329–30 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
141 This idea has been suggested to varying degrees by others. See, e.g., Morgan, supra note
69, at 202 (discussing a regime of comparative responsibility).
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“innocent” parties in joint infringement suits by placing a knowledge require-
ment on certain types or amounts of remedies. For instance, Congress could
limit the liability of innocent infringers in joint-liability claims to either the
value of the benefit they obtained from their actions, or to an “injunction only”
remedy, which could then be narrowly tailored by the courts to limit future
losses to the patent holder.142 This would allow patent holders to protect their
rights by prohibiting actions that would continue to constitute infringement of
their patent, but hopefully limit the incentive of patent trolls and other unscru-
pulous parties to pursue litigation against ordinary individuals. As Judge New-
man pointed out, the goal of most intellectual property litigation (and most
other forms of litigation) is to get to the “deep pocket,” not to pursue the indi-
vidual customers and other similarly situated parties.143
VI. CONCLUSION
The inducement-only rule for divided infringement of method patents was
successful in that it provided a remedy to the glaring hole in the enforcement
that resulted from the use of the “single-entity rule.” Despite this success, the
new precedent adds uncertainty to several areas of previously-settled law, and
appears to leave some patent holders unable to pursue either monetary or equi-
table remedies against some parties (at times the most culpable ones) who acted
to infringe the patent. The failure to pursue remedies against the right parties
frustrates the purpose the Patent Act by incentivizing parties to find ways
around the protections of Patent law in order to reap the benefits of the ingenu-
ity and creativity of others. As a consequence, inventors may have less incen-
tive to publish their discoveries through patent to the ultimate benefit of the
public.
Congress should amend the Act to lend clarity to the courts, litigators, and
inventors. A new standard should be adopted which still provides for strict
liability for patent damages in cases of single-party infringement, but also
allows joint-infringement claims with multiple parties to be resolved through
the application of comparative fault and limited availability of money damages
to parties without knowledge that their actions infringed a patent.
142 The purpose of this Note is to suggest possible solutions to the problems of divided
infringement created under the Akamai II rule. It is outside the scope of this paper to deter-
mine which of these types of remedy limitations would be best suited under what
circumstances.
143 Akamai Techs., Inc., 692 F.3d at 1332 (Newman, J., dissenting).
